Macroprudential policy in a Knightian uncertainty model with credit-, risk-, and leverage cycles by Gerba, Eddie & Zochowski, Dawid
  
Eddie Gerba and Dawid Zochowski 
Macroprudential policy in a Knightian 
uncertainty model with credit-, risk-, and 
leverage cycles 
 
Working paper 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Gerba, Eddie and Zochowski, Dawid (2015) Macroprudential policy in a Knightian uncertainty 
model with credit-, risk-, and leverage cycles. ECB working paper, European Central Bank, 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
 
Originally available from European Central Bank 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/62812/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2015 
 
© 2015 European Central Bank 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
Macrorpudential Policy in a Knightian Uncertainty 1
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July 28, 2015 4
Abstract 5
We study the impact of uncertainty on financial stability and the busi- 6
ness cycle. We extend the work of Boz and Mendoza (2014) by endogenizing 7
credit production, modifying learning mechanism into an adaptive set-up, as 8
well as including financial and monetary policies. In our model households 9
are (intrinsically) rational but take economic decisions under incomplete in- 10
formation. The incompleteness is not caused by their cognitive limitations, as 11
in rational inattention theory (Sims, 2003). Households ‘learn by doing’ and 12
once a sufficient number of realizations of the state variable have materialized, 13
and the incomplete information set is completed. This learning set-up is incor- 14
porated into a New Keynesian model with credit market frictions, extended 15
to include uncertainty, where a share of households needs external financing 16
to consume. Because of limited enforceability of financial contracts, house- 17
holds are required to provide collateral for their loans, and so the relationship 18
between the bank and household is tightened for many periods ahead. We 19
find in our framework the build up of risk, leverage, increase in consumption 20
and price of collateral takes longer than in other DSGEs with standard finan- 21
cial friction models. We also find that both the frequency and the amplitude 22
of expansions and contractions are asymmetric - recessions are less frequent 23
and deeper than expansions. Moreover, we find that boom-bust cycles occur 24
as rare events. Using the Cogley and Sargant’s (2008) definition of a severe 25
(or systemic) crisis, we find on average two such events per century. Ee also 26
find that, different from standard boom-bust cycles, a systemic crisis can be 27
followed by a sequence of subsequent contractions, as it makes the economy 28
more unstable. The result is asymmetric distributions of key macroeconomic 29
and financial variables, with high skewness and fat tails. Lastly, we also find 30
1
that, by reducing the amount of borrowing and leverage in upturns, the LTV-1
ratio regulation is effective in smoothing the cycles and reducing the effects of2
a deep contraction on the real-financial variables. We also discuss the role of3
macroprudential policy in reducing information incompleteness by generating4
information that helps the agent learn faster the new environment, or provide5
a smoother transition to the new economic environment.6
Keywords: uncertainty, financial engeneering, deregulation, leverage forecast-7
ing, macroprudential policy8
JEL: G14, G17, G21, G32, E44, E589
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1 Motivation 1
The Great Recession has been characterised by two features, which made it distinct 2
from any other recession in the post- war era. First, it was preceded by a significant 3
build-up of leverage, in particular in the household sector. Excessive borrowing, 4
in particular in the mortgage market, was in particular facilitated by securitization, 5
which reached its pick activity in 2007. Second, the depth and length of the recession 6
resulted in a substantial deviation of GDP from its long term trend in the US, UK 7
and in the euro area, which cannot be explained in a standard New Keynesian model 8
set-up even after taking account of financial frictions. 9
We put forward a model that links these two stylized facts. Financial innovation 10
shocks push the economy into a previously unexplored and unmapped state. In 11
this new state, agents do not know the true riskiness of new financial products 12
and therefore optimize under incomplete information. The incompleteness is not 13
caused by households’ cognitive limitations, but because they need to learn the true 14
riskiness of the financial products. This learning process requires sufficient number 15
of realisation of the state variable in order for the information set to be complete. As 16
learning takes time, the economy approaches the new steady state only sluggishly. 17
The core of the model follows Boz and Mendoza (2014). However, we introduce 18
three important modifications. Following Iacoviello and Neri (2009) we first split 19
households (key agents of the model) into patient, who save and produce land, and 20
impatient, who borrow and consume land. In addition, we introduce a financial 21
intermediary and explicitly model the credit market. 22
The major friction in the model is uncertainty about new state of the economy 23
after financial innovation shock. In this way, financial innovation interacting with 24
credit/margin constraints can lead to underpricing of the risk associated with a 25
new financial environment. This in turn can lead to the accumulation of leverage 26
and surges in asset prices. Because of limited enforceability of financial contracts, 27
households are required to provide collateral for their loans, and so the relationship 28
between the bank and household is tightened for many periods ahead. Once the 29
agents observe sufficient number of realisations of the new state of the economy and 30
realise that they are overlevered, this can lead to a sudden stop a la Mendoza (2010). 31
More formally, sudden stop is caused by the uncertainty regarding the transition 32
probability of such events. Since systemic crises are rare events, agents inherently 33
misprice the occurance of such events (see for instance Zeira (1999), Caballero and 34
3
Krishnamurthy (2008) or Boz and Mendoza (2014)). Uncertainty coupled with1
Fisherian deflation mechanism leads to highly volatile and asymmetric distributions2
in asset prices, consumption, debt, loan- and deposit rates. Our approached is3
loosely linked to the rational inattention theory (Sims, 2010), which recognises that4
people have finite information-processing capacity that explains well some of the5
frictions.6
We find that early realizations of the new state result in a much higher (lower)7
debt, consumption, price of collateral and risk accumulation (de-leveraging) during8
upturns (downturns) compared to standard financial friction models. Moreover,9
the loan-to-deposit ratio of banks is rapidly increasing at the onset of the financial10
innovation phase, and remains very high until sudden stop has materialized for a few11
periods. We also demonstrate that sluggish learning can explain why the economy12
can diverge from its long term trend for an extended period of time.13
Next, we evaluate the efficacy of standard macroprudential tools, such as a cap14
on the loan-to-value (LTV) in reducing the leverage of the household sector. We15
also discuss the role for a new macroprudential policy in reducing the information16
incompleteness related to financial innovation by generating information that helps17
the agent learn faster the new environment, or provide a smoother transition to the18
new economic environment.19
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce20
the model set-up. Section 3 is devoted to the main friction of the model - it discusses21
uncertainty and describes the mechanism of learning. Section 4 presents a strategy22
for solving the model, while Section 5 presents first order conditions and discusses23
their implications. [Finally, we present results in section 6 and conclude in section24
7].25
2 Model26
2.1 An overview27
The backbone of the model is a standard New Keynesian setup, extended to include28
uncertainty, learning and credit market frictions. We extend the work of Boz and29
Mendoza (2014) by endogenizing credit production, modify learning mechanism into30
an adaptive set-up, as well as include financial and monetary policies. In particular,31
we endogenize both the quantity and prices of deposits, loans, bank equity, make32
4
agents learn according to (adaptive) heuristics, and include a central bank who 1
simultaneously sets a (time-varying) policy rate and a macroprudential rule. 2
Our model economy is populated by three agents: households, financial interme- 3
diaries, and government. Moreover, we divide households into two categories: the 4
patient and the impatient types. What differentiates them is the degree of patience. 5
The discount factor β of patient households is higher than those of the impatient. 6
This forces the latter to complement their internal funds with loans from the credit 7
market. While patient households both produce and consume land, impatient only 8
consume it. Therefore we explicitly model two markets: market for land and market 9
for credit. 10
Nevertheless, what differentiates this model from most other financial friction 11
frameworks is that this one incorporates uncertainty. Financial sector developments 12
such as financial engeneering, de-regulation of markets, and increased competition 13
amongst financial intermediaries has meant that the new market structure is un- 14
known and unexplored to the participants in financial transactions. As a result, 15
agents do not know the true risks, leverage and price of collateral in the ‘new’ econ- 16
omy and therefore optimize under incomplete information. Our take on uncertainty 17
is that agents are (intrinsically) rational insofar that they efficiently optimize over 18
time, but do so under incomplete information regarding two variables in the model: 19
the leverage ratio, and the price of collateral. One is exogenous while the other is 20
endogenous, but dependent on the realization of the first. They engage in adaptive 21
learning and learn about the ‘true’ values of leverage and asset prices only after 22
observing a sufficiently long set of realizations of both variables. Note that this 23
learning is, however, slow since they only learn from their practical experiences. 24
With respect to Boz and Mendoza (2014), the learning in this framework is more 25
active, since one of the learning variables is endogenous. However, this variable is 26
dependent on the exogenous (the shadow value of collateral constraint) variable 27
which facilitates the tractability of the dynamic solution. Therefore, while agents 28
can partially benefit from experimenting with the dynamic optimization to induce 29
the endogenous land price, the exogenous component of this price will make such 30
experimenting slow and costly. In other words, the values of the ‘learning variables’ 31
cannot be directly deduced by recursively solving the remaining part of the model. 32
Moreover, we will make their learning contingent on two rules, which will make the 33
learning dynamics even more tractable. 34
Figure 1 provides an overview of the model. 35
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2.2 Households3
The consumption sector is populated by two types of infinitely lived households,4
each with a unit mass and they act atomistically in competitive markets.1 Both5
types optimize under uncertainty. The key factor which differentiates them is the6
degree of impatience. The discount factor β of impatient households (I) is lower7
than the one of patient (P ). This will ‘force’ the impatient households to engage8
in external credit market. For the sake of simplicity and tractability, we explicitly9
omit the labour supply decision of households which means that they only derive10
income from land and saving/borrowing.211
2.2.1 Patient Households12
The representative patient risk-averse household chooses consumption ct, land hold-13
ings lt+1, and deposits dt, taken as given the price of land qt, the deposit rate R
d
t , and14
the gross real interest rate Rt so as to maximize a standard CRRA utility function:15
1One could equivalently assume that in each period households die and are born with a constant
probability so that on aggregate there is a unit mass of households.
2It would be straightforward to extend the model to include a labour market, as in for instance
Gerali et al (2010).
6
Es0[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)] (1)
where u(ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ , and σ is the parameter of relative risk aversion of households. 1
Because of their relative patience, these households are made natural lenders, and 2
face the following budget constraint: 3
dt+1 + c
P
t ≤ ztg(lt) + qtlt − qtlt+1 + (1 +Rdt )dt + et (2)
The share of patient households in the population is θ (and is time invariant). 4
The production function g(lt) = l
α is a standard neoclassical one and is subject 5
to a stochastic productivity shock zt, which is known to all agents.
3Because we are 6
interested in uncertainty regarding financial frictions, we omit from imperfect beliefs 7
regarding the productivity shock. However, an immediate extension could be to also 8
introduce macroeconomic uncertainty. 9
It is crucial to note that Est in the utility function above represents expectations 10
subject to agents’ (subjective) beliefs using information available up to period t 11
(inclusive). These beliefs will differ from the ones formulated under rational expec- 12
tations. 13
2.2.2 Impatient Households 14
The impatient risk-neutral households (with the share of the total population equal 15
to 1− θ) maximize the same type of CRRA utility function:4 16
Es0[
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)] (3)
where u(ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ , but face a different budget constraint due to their impatient 17
nature: 18
3As is standard in this literature, we will assume that the TFP shock has an autoregressive
process. However, we could have equivalently assumed the TFP shock to follow a Markov process,
without changing much (or event at all) the results.
4Note that we depart here from the representative agent assumption and make the impatient
households heterogeneous by subjecting them to different initial land holding (or wealth). Aside
from this initial wealth heterogeneity, which will generate a wealth distribution in period t = 0,
the constrained optimization problem is equal for all agents within this category. We simply need
this initial heterogeneity to motivate the endogenous learning dynamics within this group, and
the (possible) reason for switches between one rule and the other. The learning dynamics will be
explained in further detail at a later stage.
7
cIt ≤ qtlt − qtlt+1 −
bt+1
Rbt
+ bt (4)
where bt are the holdings of one-period discount loans (or bonds). Because of1
imperfections in the credit market (due to limited state-verification a la Towsend),2
impatient households face restrictions in the quantity of external financing obtained3
and must provide a collateral as a security.5Therefore, the LTV that the agent must4
satisfy limits the value of credit bt+1
Rlt
to a time-varying ratio of the market value of5
their land holdings, κt according to:6
Est [κt+1]qtlt+1 ≤ −
bt+1
Rbt
(5)
From a microeconomic perspective, κ can be seen as the proportional cost of7
collateral repossession (or liquidation share) in case of default. Debt contract with8
margin clauses are also captured by this relation (Mendoza, 2010). A relaxation9
(tightening) of this constraint can either come from an increase (decrease) in the10
borrowing capacity κt or from an increase (decrease) in the value or quantity of the11
collateral qtlt+1. From a macroeconomic perspective, this relation can be interpreted12
as the LTV ratio (or leverage) set by the macroprudential authority. This interpre-13
tation will become evident later on when we study the impact of macroprudential14
policies on the model dynamics.15
The random variable κt is continuous with an upper bound at 1 and a non-16
negative lower-bound. It is also time-varying. The framework is flexible enough17
to capture asymmetric regime-switching probabilities between high and low lever-18
age capacities. This is one of the variables that impatient agents have incomplete19
information about, and which they will need to forecast.20
Notice, again that the expectations operator is dependent on beliefs regarding21
state s. This uncertainty (or ‘ignorance’) regarding the true state applies to the22
entire population equally. Therefore, agents are rational in the sense that they use23
all available information (and models) at time t, but form subjective beliefs because24
they act under (evenly distributed) incomplete information.6However, agents engage25
5See, for instance, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), or Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2013) for background information and microfoundations of the state-verification problem in ex-
ternal lending. We use the outcomes from that problem to motivate our collateral constraint,
but because of the similarity with the aforementioned frameworks, we obstain from providing full
microfoundations of that problem.
6This is very different from model settings where one agents has more information than the
other (asymmetric), or where agents use heterogeneous information and/or models (due to their
8
in (aggregate) learning and become fully aware of the true transition probabilities 1
as they approach time t = T . We will describe the learning mechanism in further 2
detail once we have outlined the full model.7 3
2.3 Financial intermediary 4
The representative financial intermediary operates in a perfectly competitive market 5
and uses deposits from patient households to give out as loans to impatient house- 6
holds. As in Gerali et al (2010) they are owned by patient households (captured by 7
the patients’ discount factor βtpλ
p
t ), and maximize the discounted sum of cash flows: 8
Es0
∞∑
t=0
βtpλ
p
t [(1+R
b)Bt−Bt+1+Dt+1−(1+Rdt )Dt+(Ebt+1−Ebt )−
κEb
2
[
Ebt
Bt
−νb]2Ebt ] (6)
subject to the balance sheet constraint: Bt = Dt + E
b
t . Bt is the total amount 9
of loans issued at time t, Dt the aggregate number of deposits received from patient 10
households, Ebt the bank capital, and ν
b is the long-term capital-to-asset ratio. The 11
last term in the above maximization problem represents the cost of operating the 12
financial intermediary. To motivate an undesirable social cost (externality) from 13
excessive intermediary leverage from the point of view of the macroprudential policy 14
maker, we impose a quadratic cost function whenever the intermediary’s capital-to- 15
asset ratio E
b
Bt
moves away from the target value νb. Because of the high number of 16
competitors in the banking industry, the individual intermediary takes the deposit 17
Rdt and the loan rates R
b
t as given when maximizing its profits.
8
18
The aggregate bank capital evolves according to: 19
Ebt+1 = (1− δb)Ebt + pibt (7)
cognitive restrictions) to infer the true states (irrationality).
7Preston (2005) pointed out that infinite horizon microfounded learning models fail to produce
optimal dynamic consumption allocations while violating their intertemporal budget constraint,
resulting in an inconsistency in the microfoundations. In defense, Hokapohja and Mittra (2011)
showed that the intertemporal accounting consistency holds along the (infinite) sequence of tem-
porary equilibria and that this model can be derived as a special case of Preston’s framework.
8The intermediary also acts under incomplete information. That is why we have conditioned
its expectations on the state s beliefs. However, their beliefs are of second order importance since
they do not optimize with respect to κt nor do they engage in learning. κt is instead assumed
to be out of direct control by either household or intermediary, and plays a key role only for the
optimization of households. Therefore we will omit intermediary’s subjective beliefs and in what
follows, approximate its beliefs with the RE expectations operator.
9
where δb measures the resources used in managing bank capital and pibt are overall1
real profits made by the financial intermediary at date-t. These are described by2
the following relation:3
pibt = R
b
tBt −RdDt −
κEb
2
[
Ebt
Bt
− νb]2Ebt − Adjbt (8)
with Adjbt denoting the adjustment costs for changing interest rates on deposits.4
This definition of profits is a narrow one as it coincides with the net interest rate5
margin. It does not include any other items from the income statement in order6
to maintain a closed-form solution for intermediary’s optimization problem while7
keeping it simple.8
2.4 Credit Market9
Next we need to derive the lending and deposit rates that financial intermediaries10
charge. Iterating the balance-sheet constraint of financial intermediaries at date t11
and t + 1 and inserting it into the cash-flow expression in equation 6, we get that12
the intermediary’s objective is to maximize:13
RbtBt −RdtDt −
κEb
2
[
Ebt
Bt
− νb]2Ebt (9)
Taking first-order conditions with respect to Bt and Dt and combining them, we14
get that the spread charged on loans is equal to:15
Rbt = R
d
t − κEb [
Ebt
Bt
− νb][E
b
t
Bt
]2 (10)
Since patient households are risk-averse, they will ask for a safe rate on their16
deposits, that by no-arbitrage condition, will equal to the real rate Rt (see for17
instance Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) or Christiano, Motto and Rostagno18
(2013) for a microfoundation behind this result).9We can thus re-write the above19
expression as:20
Rbt −Rt = κEb [
Ebt
Bt
− νb][E
b
t
Bt
]2 (11)
This expression represents the trade-offs that the financial intermediary faces in21
9Following Gerali et al (2010), we could equivalently assume that the financial intermediary
has continuous and risk-free access to central bank liquidity at the safe rate Rt, which by arbitrage
would make the deposit rate equal to the safe rate.
10
setting the lending rate. The left-hand side represents the marginal benefit from 1
increasing lending meanwhile the right-hand side represents the costs of increasing 2
leverage (by deviating from the νb target). The final lending rate will be set where 3
the two are equal. 4
2.5 Land Market 5
We can show that the effects of the collateral constraint on asset pricing can be 6
derived by combining the Euler equations of land for the two households.10Solving 7
the equations forward in which the future stream of land dividends is discounted 8
at the stochastic discount factor and adjusted for the shadow value of the credit 9
constraint: 10
qt = E
s
t
∞∑
j=0
[
j∏
i=0
βu′(ct+1+i)
u′(ct+i)− µt+iκt+i ]zt+1+jg
′(lt+1+j) (12)
This condition equalizes the equilibrium price of land with the marginal cost of 11
investment. Looking at the denominator of I.22, we see that the collateral constraint 12
lowers land prices since it increases the rate of return at which future land dividends 13
are discounted. It is forward-looking since not only will a binding constraint at t 14
reduce the value of land, but also if agents expect that the constraint can bind at 15
any future date Est [µt+iκt+i] for any i > 0, the value of land will fall. 16
If we further define the next period marginal utility of consumption as λt+1 ≡ 17
βu′(ct+1) and return on land as: 18
Rqt+1 =
zt+1+jg
′(lt+1+j) + qt+1
qt
(13)
we can define the (subjective) premium on land as (Mendoza, 2010): 19
Est [R
q
t+1 −Rt] =
(1− κt)µt − Covst (λt+1, Rqt+1)
Est (λt+1)
(14)
The land premium rises in every state in which the collateral constraint binds 20
because of these three effects: 21
• The direct effect, (1−κt)µt, is due to a rise in the shadow value of the collateral 22
constraint (with an upper bound determined by κt, the amount of the collateral 23
that can be turned into debt). 24
10We follow the method described in Mendoza (2010).
11
• The indirect effect, represented by a lower Covst (λt+1, Rqt+1) and a higher1
Est (λt+1).2
• Because of the collateral constraint, the household’s ability to smoothen her3
consumption is limited, leading her to transfer the consumption into the future.4
To see the effects of this on the price of tangible, we can write the land price as5
a function of the return according to:6
qt = E
s
t
∞∑
j=0
[
j∏
i=0
1
Est [R
q
t+1]
]zt+1+jg
′(lt+1+j) (15)
since the expected land return satisfies the condition qtE
s
t [R
q
t+1] = E
s
t [zt+1+jg
′(lt+1+j)].7
Then, as Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) show, an increase in expected return will lead8
to lower equity prices in the current period, since the discount rate of future divi-9
dends will increase due to the binding collateral constraint, in the current or next10
period. Hence, if the collateral constraint binds at least occasionally in the stochas-11
tic steady state, the entire equilibrium asset pricing function will be distorted by12
the constraint (independent of whether the constraint binds in the current period13
or not).14
If these effects are at work under rationally formed expectations (with the knowl-15
edge of the true state of κ), these effects are further accentuated if we in addition16
introduce learning into this framework. To understand how, one needs to exam-17
ine the interactions between the collateral constraint and learning regarding the κt18
variable. Suppose that the constraint was binding at t. In booms (or states with19
high leverage possibilities), the price of asset is higher, which will relax the LTV20
constraint. From equation 15 it implies that the land return is lower. So assuming21
that beliefs are optimistic (pessimistic) in a boom (bust), impatient households will22
assign a higher probability to lower (higher) future land returns than under RE. This23
will push land price further up (down), which via the LTV-constraint, will result in24
higher (lower) indebtedness.25
Taking into account the tight and procyclical link between leverage and asset26
prices, and considering that the the value of κt (which is an argument of the land27
price qt) is unknown and therefore forecasted, it is reasonable to also make the value28
qt uncertain (and state contingent). Hence households will have to forecast the29
values of κ as well as q.30
12
Following Boz and Mendoza (2014), for simplicity we will assume that the aggre- 1
gate land supply is fixed and equal to 1. Consequently, the market clearing condition 2
in the land market: 3
1 = θlPt + (1− θ)lIt (16)
implies that the land holdings of the representative household must at each t 4
satisfy lt = 1, as well as the production function will be reduced to ztg(1).
11
5
2.6 Central Bank 6
To close the model, we separately model the two policies of the central bank. Assum- 7
ing that the variables without time subscripts denote their steady state values, we 8
can characterize the monetary policy of the central bank with a standard Taylor-rule 9
(expressed in deviations-from-the-target terms): 10
Rt
R
=
Rt−1
R
γR
[
pit
pi
γpi yt
y
γy
]1−γReR,t (17)
where R,t is a monetary policy shock. 11
On the other end, macroprudential policy is modeled as a set of ex ante rules 12
that the intermediary sector must obay to. The first rule is a cap on the LTV ratio 13
(independent of the state): 14
κt = κ¯ (18)
Alternatively, we will test a more elaborate version of the above LTV-rule. Re- 15
cently, several papers (Lambertini et al (2013), Angelini et al (2014)) have proposed 16
Taylor-type macroprudential rules as a good approximation of the Basel II/III-style 17
of regulatory requirements. We will therefore perform an alternative scenario where 18
the central bank uses: 19
κt = ρκ ∗ κt−1 + (1− ρκ) ∗ κ∗ + (1− ρκ) ∗ (bt − bt−1) (19)
,where κ∗ is the steady state value for the LTV-ratio. We calibrate it to 2 in line 20
with the above rule in order to facilitate the comparison between a static (state- 21
independent) and a dynamic (state-dependent) version. 22
11Hence all the variation in land will come in its value, which is a function of the intertemporal
consumption smoothing of households, as well as the shadow value of collateral constraint.
13
3 Uncertainty and Learning1
Now that we outlined the key decision makers in the model, we need to devote2
some attention to the non-standard aspects of our model. In particular, we wish to3
describe the environment and the processes that govern the learning of our agents.4
3.1 The general outline5
Following Boz and Mendoza (2011, 2014), we model a situation in which financial6
engineering and market de-regulation lead to an increase in credit, leverage and risks.7
Agents know therefore that the environment (and the value of all these variables)8
has changed, but they don’t know exactly by how much. Thus, the uncertainty9
concerns the ‘true’ values of the LTV-ratio κ, and the land price q. 12Therefore, in10
contrast to Boz and Mendoza (2011, 2014), we assume that there are more than two11
possible future regimes as the values of land and leverage can have many different12
realizations. Moreover, in our framework agents are adaptive learners and use simple13
heuristics to forecast the two variables. In the (very) long-run, their beliefs converge14
to rational expectations. In the short run, however, their beliefs will be different15
from the equilibrium with full information. They learn only from past experience16
and fully ‘understand’ the riskiness of the new financial environment only after they17
have observed a sufficiently large sample of realizations. As a result, agents are slow18
learners and their learning process is strongly history dependent.1319
Cecchetti et al (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2008b) show that CRRA utility20
functions with Markov process for the consumption growth can generate asymmetric21
behaviour in consumption. High-growth states in consumption are persistent and22
common. However, once a low-growth state has been reached, the contractions are23
severe, with a mean decline of 6.785% p.a. Moreover, once the economy is in the24
low-growth state, there is a certain positive probability of running into a sequence of25
contractions, with a total decline in consumption amounting to 25% (assuming the26
12Equivalently, and using the approach by Boz and Mendoza (2014), one could say that the
uncertainty is regarding the transition probability to a new state. This state is a subset to a
bounded set between 0 and 1.
13In contrast, agents are Bayesian learners in Boz and Mendoza (2014) and their learning
space is constrained to only two realizations of the ‘learning variable’: High or Low leverage
states. In addition, the uncertainty concerns leverage only (and not land prices, despite the fact
that uncertainty will enter the land price function via the shadow value of collateral constraint.)
Therefore the speed of learning and convergence is expected to be higher in their model compared
to ours once we acknowledge that the probability space of the (learning) variables in their model
is much smaller.
14
contraction lasts for 4 years with a probability of 7.1%). We will use this threshold 1
to identify ex post severe contractions (or systemic crises) in our model. 2
The current learning set-up means that agents learn quickly about the lever- 3
age/land price states that occur more frequently. Therefore, taking into account 4
that severe contractions are rare, learning about them will also be slower and asym- 5
metric with respect to expansions. Moreover, because the ergodic probability of 6
a contraction is as small as 0.0434 (Cogley and Sargent, 2008b), the time elapsed 7
before a sufficiently large sample of contractions has been observed is very large. 8
This retards the learning of contractions significantly. 9
The type of uncertainty we model in this paper generates fat tails. In addition, 10
the tails are asymmetric since contractions are more rare than expansions, and so the 11
lower tail (low (or negative) values of consumption, credit and bank equity, or high 12
values of leverage and interest rates) is significantly fatter than the upper tail (as 13
the uncertainty regarding it is higher). This leaves open the possibility for serious 14
downward spirals in contractions. 15
3.2 Specification of the learning process 16
Let us next formalize the learning described above. Our approach is similar to 17
De Grauwe and Macchiarelli insofar that we use the same type of heuristics and 18
updating of beliefs. 19
Under rational expectations, the forecasted variable will equal its realized value 20
in the next period, i.e. EtXt+1 = Xt+1, denoting generically by Xt any variable 21
in the model. However, as anticipated above, we depart from this assumption in 22
this framework by making the forecast contingent on imperfect information, but 23
allowing the agents to learn. Expectations are replaced by a convex combination 24
of heterogeneous expectation operators Etκt+1 = E
s
t κt+1 and Etqt+1 = E
s
t qt+1. In 25
particular, agents forecast the LTV-ratio and the land price using two alternative 26
forecasting rules: fundamentalist vs. extrapolative rule. Under the fundamentalist 27
rule, agents are assumed to use the steady-state value of the LTV-ratio - κ∗, against 28
a naive forecast based on the LTV’s latest available observation (extrapolative rule). 29
Equally for the value of land, fundamentalist agents are assumed to base their ex- 30
pectations on the steady-state value - q∗ against the extrapolatists who naively base 31
their forecast on the latest available observable.14Defining i = (κ, q) we can formally 32
14The latest available observation is the best forecast of the future, i.e. a random walk approach
15
express the fundamentalists as:1
Es,ft it+1 = i
∗ (20)
and the extrapolative (or adaptive) rule as:2
Es,et it+1 = θit−1 (21)
This particular form of adaptive expectations has previously been modelled by3
Pesaran (1987), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), and Branch and McGough (2009),4
amongst others, in the literature. Setting θ = 1 captures the ”naive” agents (as they5
have a strong belief in history dependence), while a θ < 1 or θ > 1 represents an6
”adaptive” or an ”extrapolative” agent (Brock and Hommes, 1998). For reasons7
of tractability, we set θ = 1 in this model, but the model dynamics would not be8
significantly altered with any of the other parameter values.9
Note that for the sake of consistency with standard RE DSGE model, all variables10
here are expressed in gaps. Focusing on their cyclical component makes the model11
symmetric with respect to the steady state (see Harvey and Jaeger, 1993). Moreover,12
this facilitates the interpretation of the model as the fundamentalists can be seen as13
‘benchmarking’ the variable values, meanwhile the problem of extrapolists is pinned14
down to guessing the deviation of these values from their benchmark (or steady15
state).16
Next, agents’ preference for one forecast over the other depends on the (histor-17
ical) performance of the two rules given by a publically available fitness measure,18
the mean square forecasting error (MSFE). After time t+ 1 realization is revealed,19
the two predictors are evaluated ex post using MSFE and new fractions of agent20
types are determined. These updated fractions are used to determine next period21
(aggregate) forecasts of LTV-and land prices, and so on. Agents’ rationality con-22
sists therefore in choosing the best-performing predictor using the updated fitness23
measure. There is a strong empirical motivation for inserting this type of switch-24
ing mechanism amongst different forecasting rules (see DeGrauwe and Macchiarelli25
(2015) for a brief discussion of the empirical literature, Frankel and Froot (1990)26
for a discussion of fundamentalist behaviour, and Roos and Schmidt (2012), Cogley27
(2002), Cogley and Sargent (2007) and Cornea, Hommes and Massaro (2013) for28
evidence of extrapolative behaviour in the context of microeconomic and financial29
decision-making.).30
16
The aggregate market forecasts of the LTV-ratio and land price are obtained as 1
a weighted average of each rule (i = κ, q): 2
Est it+1 = α
f
tE
s,f
t it+1 + α
e
tE
s,e
t it+1 (22)
where αft is the weighted average of fundamentalists, and α
e
t that of the ex- 3
trapolists. These shares are time-varying and based on the dynamic predictor se- 4
lection. The mechanism allows to switch between the two forecasting rules based 5
on MSFE / utility of the two rules, and increase (decrease) the weight of one rule 6
over the other at each t. Assuming that the utilities of the two alternative rules 7
have a deterministic and a random component (with a log-normal distribution as 8
in Manski and McFadden (1981) or Anderson et al (1992)), the two weights can be 9
defined based on each period utility Uxi,t, i = (κ, q), x = (f, e) according to: 10
αfi,t =
exp(γU fi,t)
exp(γU fi,t) + exp(γU
e
i,t)
(23)
αei,t ≡ 1− αfi,t =
exp(γU ei,t)
exp(γU fi,t) + exp(γU
e
i,t)
(24)
,where the utilities are defined as: 11
U fi,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[it−k−1 − Es,ft−k−2it−k−1]2 (25)
U ei,t = −
∞∑
k=0
wk[it−k−1 − Es,et−k−2it−k−1]2 (26)
and wk = (ρ
k(1 − ρ)) (with 0 < ρ < 1) are gemoetrically declining weights 12
adapted to include the degree of forgetfulness in the model (DeGrauwe, 2012). γ is 13
a parameter measuring the extent to which the deterministic component of utility 14
determines actual choice. A value of 0 implies a perfectly stochastic utility. In 15
that case, each agent decides to be one type or the other simply by tossing a coin, 16
implying a probability of each type equalizing to 0.5. On the other hand, γ = ∞ 17
imples a fully deterministic utility, and the probability of using the fundamentalist 18
(extrapolative) rule is either 1 or 0. Another way of interpreting γ is in terms of 19
learning from past performance: γ = 0 imples zero willingness to learn, while it 20
increases with the size of the parameter, i.e. 0 < γ <∞. 21
As mentioned above, agents will subject the performance of rules to a goodness- 22
17
of-fit measure and choose the one that generates least errors. In that sense, agents1
are ’boundedly’ rational and learn from their mistakes. More importantly, this2
discrete choice mechanism allows to endogenize the distribution of heterogeneous3
agents over time with the proportion of each agent using a certain rule (parameter4
α). The approach is consistent with the empirical studies (Cornea et al, 2012) who5
show that the distribution of heterogeneous agents varies in reaction to economic or6
financial volatility (Carroll (2003), Mankiw et al (2004)).7
3.3 Learning - stability remark8
One valid critique of learning environments in macroeconomics has been that they9
often become unstable. Unless strict boundaries are imposed on the learning process10
(i.e. a (high) degree of bounded rationality is imposed which ensures that system11
will, locally, converge to rational expectations equilibrium), the model often turns12
explosive.15 In our framework, however, we do impose strict limits on the learning13
process and trace the learning dynamics throughout the entire simulations. More-14
over, using the results of Bullard and Suda (2011) that macroeconomic systems with15
Bayesian learning are non-explosive as expectations are locally stable in the sense16
of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and the insights from Camerer and Ho (1999) or17
Payzan-LeNestour and Bossaerts (2014) that adaptive and Bayesian learning are18
‘close cousins’, we can conclude that our framework does not suffer from explosive19
paths or instability.1620
3.4 The recursive solution method and the numerical set-up21
We formulate the model in recursive form and solve using recursive methods (see22
DeGrauwe (2012) for further details). This allows for non-linear effects and is a23
more cost-effective alternative to the standard Bellman equation approach since we24
avoid using aggregate states and iterations to converge on the representative agent25
condition, matching individual and aggregate laws of motion for credit.26
The model has eleven endogenous variables: land price, leverage, consumption,27
loans, interest rate on loans, deposits, interest rate on deposits, bank profits, bank28
15A very popular example of a bounded rationality environment in the literature has been the
recursive least square learning.
16For future work, however, it would be interesting to computationally test the long-run dynam-
ics of our learning framework, and compare with other (similar) versions of adaptive or Bayesian
updating set-ups.
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equity, land, and the interest rate. The first four are obtained after solving the fol- 1
lowing reduced equilibrium system that iterates on the policy and pricing functions 2
using households” FOCs and the forecasting rules: 3
1 µfx c¯ 0
1 0 −1 0
1 1 −1 1
1 1 0 −1


qt
κt
ct
bt
 =
4
=

αν 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


Est [qt+1]
Est [κt+1]
Est [ct+1]
Est [bt+1]
+
5
+

1− ν −µfx 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


qt−1
κt−1
ct−1
bt−1
+
6
+

0 1 0
0 1 1 + rdt−1
1 1 0
1 1 0


rbt−1
lt−1
dt−1
+

1 0 0 0
1 −1 1 0
0 0 1 −1
0 1 0 −1


zt
Ebt
ψt
rt

Using matrix notation, we can write this as: AZt = BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt.7
We can solve forZt by inverting: Zt = A
−1(BE˜tZt+1 + CZt−1 + DXt−1 + Evt) 8
and assuring A to be non-singular. 9
Once these optimal values for the policy functions have been found, they are 10
then inserted into the remaining general equilibrium system and the values of the 11
remaining model variables are recursively solved. So, the solution for land, the 12
interest rate on borrowings, deposits, bank profits, bank equity, and the interest 13
rate are recursively obtained using the solutions obtained for land price, leverage, 14
consumption and loans iterated above. 15
Expectation terms with an s Est implies that we derive the optimal solution using 16
the subjective beliefs governed by the learning process specified above. 17
Note that for the forecasts of land price and leverage, the expectation terms in 18
equations 5, 12 and 15 are substituted by the discrete choice mechanism in 22. 19
19
We have four shocks in this model. zt is a standard TFP shock in the land1
production function. Ebt is a shock to bank capital (or equity), ψt denotes a shock2
to income (or collateral value), whereas rt is a standard monetary policy shock.3
Their parametrizations will be discussed in the next subsection.4
3.5 Calibration and simulations5
We will divide the discussion in three parts. First, we will discuss the parameters6
related to the general equilibrium set-up. We will continue with the parameters7
related to the learning dynamics in the second part, followed by the calibration of8
the four shocks in the model. A full list of parameters and their values are reported9
in Table 1.10
For the calibration of parameters related to the general equilibrium, we use the11
parameters calibrated or estimated in a number of closely related DSGE models. In12
particular, the (constant) risk aversion coefficient σ in households’ utility function13
is, following Boz and Mendoza (2014), set to 2. We set the share of impatient14
households in the total economy to 0.61, as in Brzoza-Brzezina et al (2014), in order15
to match the micro data on the share of liquidity constrained consumers reported16
in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This is also in line with the number17
reported in Justiniano et al (2015). The discount factor β of patient households is18
higher and set to 0.9943 in order to obtain an annualized average real interest rate19
of slightly below 3%. This is in line with much of the literature, including Gerali20
et al (2010) and Brzoza-Brzezina et al (2014). The discount factor of the impatient21
types is lower and set to 0.975, as in Gerali et al (2010).22
For parameters related to financial intermediaries, we use the estimation results23
from Gerali et al (2010) and De Grauwe and Macchiarelli (2015). In particular, we24
set the share of bank profits in bank equity equation ωb to 1, the cost for managing25
banks’ capital position δk to 0.1049, the adjustment costs of changing the interest26
rate on deposits Adjb to 0 (since the unlimited access to liquidity from the central27
bank makes this process costless) and the target capital-to-loans ratio νb (or the28
inverse of the leverage target ratio) to 0.09. In order to make the deviation from29
this target value costly, we calibrate the cost parameter κEb to 11.49, which is the30
value obtained from estimations in Gerali et al (2010).31
Turning to the land market, we use the values obtained in Boz and Mendoza32
(2014). In particular, we calibrate the factor share of land in the production α to33
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0.025, and we set the supply of land l fixed at 1. The (fixed) Lagrange multiplier 1
µfx in the credit constraint, which is used to derive the shadow value of collateral 2
in the land price function in equation 12, is set to 0.30. 3
Following Boz and Mendoza (2014), we set the consumption-GDP ratio in the 4
aggregate resource constraint to 0.670, or two-thirds of the total output. Meanwhile, 5
the remaining third is split between land and bank equity, where land-GDP ratio is 6
set to 0.20 and bank equity-GDP to 0.13. 7
For the Taylor-rule parameters, we use the values estimated in Gerali et al (2010). 8
In particular, the interest rate smoothing (AR) coefficient is set to 0.77, the response 9
to inflation in the Taylor rule to 2.01, meanwhile the response to output is set to 10
0.35. Equally, for macroprudential policy, we set the target (or cap) on household 11
leverage κ¯ to 2, and the response of LTV to credit growth ρκ in the Taylor-type 12
macroprudential rule to 0.75, as in Lambertini et al (2013). 13
We turn to the parameters governing the learning process. The initial fraction 14
of fundamentalists and extrapolists, αf0 and α
e
0 are each set to 0.5. The switching 15
parameter, γ in equations 23 and 24 is set to 1, as in Brock and Hommes (1998). ρ, 16
or the gemoterically declining weight adapted to include a degree of forgetfulness in 17
the learning dynamics in 25 and 26, is set to 0.5. For fundamentalists, we set the SS 18
value of LTV, κ∗ to 0.93 (as in Brzoza-Brzezina et al, 2014), and for the land price 19
q∗ simply to 1. To conclude this part, we make the land price highly contingent 20
on its forecasted value by households, and therefore set the weight of the forecasted 21
land price in the land price function ν equal to 0.7. That is in order to capture the 22
uncertainty regarding its future value in the aggregate land dynamics. 23
We are considering four shocks in this model. A shock to TFP (or technology), 24
(bank) capital quiality, household income, and a monetary policy shock. The stan- 25
dard deviation of all shocks is normalized to 1 to facilitate the interpretation of the 26
impulse responses. In line with the literature, the TFP and monetary policy shocks 27
include an AR component equal to 0.90. (Bank) capital quality and income shocks, 28
on the other hand, are each modelled as a white noise (with no AR component) 29
since they lack a theoretical grounding for incorporating inertias into their process. 30
We simulate the model for 2000 periods, or 500 years. 31
21
Table 1: Parameters in the model and their descriptions
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Calibration
σ Constant risk aversion parameter in CRRA utility function 2
ω Share of impatient households int he economy 0.61
βP Discount factor of patient households 0.9943
βI Discount factor of impatient households 0.975
ωb Share of bank profits in bank equity accumulation 1
δk Cost for managing banks’ capital position 0.1049
Adjb Adjustment cost for changing the deposit rate 0
νb Target capital-to-asset ratio 0.09
κEb Cost of deviating from target capital-to-asset ratio 11.49
α Factor share of land in production 0.025
l Aggregate land supply 1
µfx (Fixed) Langrangian multiplier of the credit constraint 0.3
c¯ Consumption-GDP ratio 0.67
l¯ Land-GDP ratio 0.20
c¯ Bank equity-GDP ratio 0.130
γr Interest rate smoothing parameter 0.77
γpi Response to inflation in the Taylor rule 2.01
γy Response to output in the Taylor rule 0.35
κ¯ Cap on household LTV-ratio 2
ρκ Response of LTV to credit growth 0.75
αf0 Initial fraction of fundamentalists 0.5
αe0 Initial fraction of extrapolators 0.5
γ Switching parameter in MSFE 1
κ∗ SS LTV-ratio 0.93
q∗ SS land price 1
ν Weight of forecasted land price in the land price function 0.7
c˜ SS consumption parameter in CRRA geometric series 0.125
z Standard deviation of the TFP shock 1
Eb Standard deviation of the capital quality shock 1
ψ Standard deviation of the income quality shock 1
r Standard deviation of the monetary policy shock 1
ρz AR parameter in the TFP shock process 0.9
ρEb AR parameter in the capital quality shock process 0
ρψ AR parameter in the income shock process 0
ρr AR parameter in the monetary policy shock process 0.9
4 Quantitative results1
Our analysis consists of four parts. The first part is a depiction and analysis of the2
nature of the model variables over the business cycle, with a particular focus on the3
systemic events. The second part is an examination of the (model generated) second-4
, and higher-order moments. In the third part, we will analyze (model consistent)5
impulse responses to the four shocks described above. To end, in the final part6
we will examine the effects of a macroprudential policy in terms of smoothening7
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the business cycles, reducing the asymmetries and fat tails of model variables, and 1
improving the welfare. 2
4.1 Forcing variables 3
The four shocks we will examine are: 4
• (Positive) TFP (or technology) shock, zt 5
yt = ztztg(lt) (27)
,where the TFP shock has an AR component, ρz calibrated to 0.9: 6
zt = ρ
z + η (28)
• (Negative) capital quality shock, Ebt 7
Ebt+1 = (1− δb)Ebt + pibt + Ebt (29)
,where Ebt is a white noise shock to the evolution of bank equity stock. 8
• (Positive) income shock, ψt: 9
κtqtlt+1ψt ≤ −bt+1
Rbt
(30)
,where ψt is a white noise shock to the collateral constraint of impatient house- 10
holds. And a 11
• Standard (negative) monetary policy shock (r): 12
rt = γ
rrt−1 + γpipit + γyyt + r (31)
and r is a white noise shock to monetary policy. In our simulations, we calibrate 13
the interest rate smoothing parameter γr to 0.9. The standard deviation of all shocks 14
is normalized to 1. 15
23
4.2 The nature of cycles in the model1
Figures II.1 to II.4 depict the business cycle evolution of key model variables, such2
as consumption, price of land, loans to households, interest rate on borrowings,3
bank equity, nominal interest rate, learning variables, and market sentiment. We4
are interested in examining two things in this section. On one end, we wish to5
understand the type of boom-bust cycles that are captured in this model, focusing6
special attention to whether the model is capable of generating systemic crises as7
rare events. These are depicted in Figures II.1 to II.3. On the other end, we wish to8
track the learning process and analyze its impact on the model dynamics. Those are9
depicted in Figure II.4. Remember that the model is simulated over 2000 quarters10
(or 500 years).11
4.2.1 Macro-financial cycles12
In all graphs, the zero-line represents the trend and the area above (below) it repre-13
sents the positive (negative) cyclical deviation from the trend. The series should be14
interpreted as the filtered cyclical component of a time-series with an independent15
time-varying (or time-invariant) trend.16
Looking at consumption, the first thing to note is the asymmetric cycles that the17
model generates. While there are several episodes of heavy boom in consumption18
(t=100,550,950,1100 or 1600), these are followed by even sharper falls in the level19
of consumption. So while the heaviest boom in consumption is around 20 % above20
the trend, the sharpest contractions lie around 30 % below the trend. Moreover,21
the persistence in booms is higher than the persistence in busts. Hence both the22
frequency and the amplitude of expansions and contractions are asymmetric.23
Next, the model is capable of generating small as well as large boom-bust cycles.24
While the majority of the cycles are small, several of them can be considered ‘large’.25
Using Cogley and Sargant’s (2008) definition that a severe (or systemic) crisis is one26
where consumption contracs by at least 25 %, we find 10 such contractions during the27
500 year simulation exercise. They are marked by a grey arrow in Figure II.1. If we28
take an average over the entire sample, than two systemic crises occur every century.29
In most of these, the contraction in consumption is higher than the 25%, which makes30
them clear candidates for a truly systemic contraction. Note, moreoverover that the31
contractions are preceeded by a heavy surge in consumption. This is in particular32
true for the second, seventh and tenth contraction, where consumption increases by33
24
30-40% before it drastically reverses. Also, the build-up phase is much longer than 1
the subsequent bust. Hence, this allows enough time for risks and credit to build 2
up before they materialize. 3
In addition, there are two key stylized facts that the model captures well. First, 4
Cogley and Sargent (2008b) note that once an economy is in a low-growth state, 5
there is a certain positive probability of running into a sequence of contractions. 6
That is what we see after contraction 2. While the economy tries to recover from 7
the first downfall, in ten years (on average) it runs into the next systemic crisis. 8
As a matter of fact, five systemic contractions occur in less than 300 quarters (75 9
years). The second stylized fact is that a long build-up of stocks, risks and liquidity 10
in the (financial) system makes the entire economy much more unstable and prone 11
to heavy reversals than an economy where the long build-up phase is controlled and 12
shortened. In our model, that is exactly what occurs. Prior to t=700, the economy 13
only experiences one systemic crisis. However, after the exceptionally long build-up 14
phase in t=[180, 700], the economy suffers 9 crises in around 1000 quarters (or 6 15
crises in 700 quarters). That is a 6-fold increment during the same time interval. 16
Hence this confirms the fact that a long period with high and sustained build-up of 17
risks, credit, leverage (and speculation via asset prices) with only minor contractions 18
changes the entire structure of the economy over the longer-run. This is because 19
the heavy and sustained accumulation of stocks and optimism make the economy 20
more susceptible to shocks and significantly increases the probability of future sharp 21
downturns. 22
This observation is further confirmed by the business cycle evolution of loans in 23
Figure II.1, where 6 out of the 10 systemic crises result in the historically heaviest 24
contraction in lending. Total lending to households decreases by between 15-20% 25
during those systemic crises, representing a highly significant downturn. Moreover, 26
the preceeding build-up of credit before systemic crisis 2, and the following cycle of 27
contractions are clearly visible also on the same graph. 28
The same pattern is observed for land prices. During the same episode that 29
consumption sharply contracts, the land price falls by between 30 and 45%. Via 30
wealth and credit channels, it significantly contracts consumption, which is why we 31
observe the systemic crises above. Moreover, the speculation hypothesis mentioned 32
above is confirmed. Because agents have to forecast the land price, and they can only 33
do it based on the historical evidence on realizations of the same (or on the steady 34
state value normalized in this case to 1), a market sentiment cycle will inherently take 35
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over in the valuation process. The more that the agents observe positive realizations1
of the land price, the higher the probability of them forecasting a higher land price for2
the next period. Such sentiments re-inforce themselves even more when a long and3
sustained series of increasing values have realized and the sample of systemic crisis4
is small. That is exactly what happens between t=[180, 700]. During this period,5
the land price has an increasing trend and the economy had only experienced one6
systemic contraction so far. Therefore, while the land price takes a while to start7
this positive feed-back loop of increases, once in t=270, enough positive realizations8
of land price have occured and the systemic contraction is sufficiently far behind in9
order for the agents to turn truly optimistic and put a heavy weight on an increasing10
future land price at the same time as it puts a negligible probability on a future fall11
in the price. But, after the second crisis, the weight they put on future contractions12
is significantly higher, and since we include memory in their learning, the agents13
also become more ‘insecure’ in their forecast and thus put a higher probability of14
such events re-occuring in the near future.17Hence why we see a downward spiral in15
prices after the second systemic crises has realized.16
Turning to bank equity and interest rates on borrowing, we also see that the17
systemic crises affect the profitability of the bank. Taking into account that bank18
equity and the interest rate on borrowing have the opposite signs in equation I.13,19
once the price of household collateral (land) starts to contract, the financial inter-20
mediary is obliged to increase its borrowing rate, as the probability of default of21
impatient households has increased and so it is more risky to lend to them. How-22
ever, that will reduce the amount of total borrowing, and thus the profits of the23
bank (since the fall in lending is higher than the rise in the interest rate margin).24
This will subsequently lead to a fall in bank equity, as governed by equation 7. On25
contrary, the higher the bank equity that a financial intermediary holds (a feature26
in upturns), the more leeway the bank has to extend its lending, and so it reduces27
its lending rate. This is why we see the opposite business cycle evolution for bank28
equity and the lending rate. Note also how sensitive the interest rate setting is to29
movements in bank equity. Roughly a 1% drop (rise) in bank equity from its long-30
term trend generates a 10% rise (drop) in the lending rate from its trend. This is31
due to the quadratic composite social cost imposed on excessive leverage in equa-32
tion I.13, which pushes the interest rate up by more than proportionally. Due to33
17Remember that the parameters ]ρ and γ in the learning set-up in equations 25 and 23 guide
the memory of the agents in our learning framework.
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this heavy (de)-leveraging (or rebalancing) over the cycle that the financial sector 1
becomes a powerful propagator of shocks, originated within the financial sector as 2
well as outside. Thus a sufficiently high de-leveraging can, via the lending channel, 3
cause a severe downturn in the real economy. We will analyze this mechanism in 4
more depth in the impulse response section. 5
4.2.2 Learning cycles and model dynamics 6
The model allows us to track the learning dynamics explicitly and examine how 7
imperfect information generates market sentiment in the market for land. 8
The first graph in Figure II.4 depicts the proportion of the households that use 9
the extrapolist rule to forecast the leverage ratio. A value of 1 means that the 10
entire population uses that rule, whereas 0 means that the entire population uses 11
the fundamentalist rule. The same applies for the forecast of land price in the second 12
graph. Finally, the graph on market sentiment depicts the (subjective) valuation of 13
the land price that all agents expect will be in the next period. A value of 1 means 14
that all households believe that the price will rise, i.e. optimism while a value of 0 15
means that all households believe the price will fall, i.e. pessimism. 16
The first thing to note is that there are cycles, or regime-switches, in the usage 17
of forecast rules. There are, however, more regime-switches in the forecast of land 18
price compared to leverage. Taking into account that the switching parameter γ 19
is calibrated to 1 in both cases, the difference between the two is endogenously 20
generated by the model. This means that the goodness of fit of the fundamentalist 21
rule in the case of leverage is, on average, higher (in relative terms) compared to the 22
same rule in the forecast of land price. We believe this is due to the (more urgent) 23
necessity of households to use a fixed point reference when conditionally optimizing 24
on the leverage ratio. Since leverage is an exogenous process at time t=0 and it is 25
dependent on the price of risks (which in this set-up agents do not fully know in 26
real time), a ‘benchmarking’ approach in forecasting becomes much more attractive 27
(and efficient) as agents can use a fixed reference to rationally optimize conditional 28
on this simple heuristics. 29
Nevertheless, note that in both forecast games, there is significantly more inertia 30
in the extrapolative rule. This means that once households use the extrapolative 31
rule, they are very likely to remain under that regime. As a result, most of the time 32
the agents prefer to use history to forecast the future. We should therefore expect 33
to observe strong market sentiment building up over time. 34
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That is confirmed by the third graph in Figure II.4. Most of the time, agents are1
optimists. However, at some point the sentiment reverts and agents turn pessimists.2
Just as in Boz and Mendoza (2014), this occurs once they have observed one nega-3
tive realization of the variable they forecast. Since in period t=0 households start4
in a tabula raza environment, the first observation of the realized land price will5
determine their forecast of the future price. The more of price rises they observe,6
the lower the probability they will put on a future price decrease, and therefore they7
will turn more and more optimistic over time. However, as soon as a reverse in8
price is observed, households will put a very low (if not zero) probability on future9
price increase, and will therefore forecast a price decrease. Since booms are longer10
and more sustained than busts, agents will remain in the optimistic interval for11
longer periods of time compared to the pessimistic interval. But as agents observe12
more of the price decreases, they learn about them and put a higher probability of13
them occuring in the future. Thus that is why we see an increase in the number14
of sentiment-switches from optimism to pessimism as time goes by. The speed of15
this is governed by how much weight they put on the historical realizations (θ pa-16
rameter) and how far back they remember,(ρ and γ parameters, i.e. how adaptive17
their learning is). Because we have calibrated the parameters in such a way that18
households are slow learners, the time elapsed before more frequent switches occur19
is considerable. Note also that exactly for this reason, persistent optimism build-up20
can also occur after 1000 quarters of simulation since positive observations from21
recent history outweigh the learning from more distant past if a sufficient sequence22
of price increases has realized.23
Our sequence of beliefs is in many ways similar to the ones obtained in Boz and24
Mendoza (2011, 2014), but with some important deviations. Comparing the third25
graph in their Figure 6 to our third graph in Figure II.4, in both frameworks the op-26
timistic interval is more persistent. Moreover, as the number of low leverage regimes27
is observed, the number of switches to pessimism increases. However, because the28
state-space is dichotomous in their world, the reversals are also more abrupt. This29
should result in sharper turning-points over the business cycle, not because of the30
model dynamics but because of the constrained model learning construction. In our31
case, on the other hand, households ‘guess’ a full continuous state-space of values,32
and so the reversals are more gradual. Hence, if sharp declines are observed in the33
business cycles, they are entirely generated by the endogenous model dynamics (via34
the interaction between learning and financial frictions), and not by a demarca-35
28
tion of the state-space. Further to that, learning in their framework is significantly 1
faster than in ours, which means that convergence to a RE model is achieved after 2
a relatively short period of time. Looking at the first two graphs of Figure 6, the 3
subjective transition probability is very close to the actual probability already be- 4
fore 300 quarters (or 75 years). That is possible because the state-space is reduced 5
and because agents engage in restricted Bayesian learning (which has been shown to 6
converge faster). In our model, on the other hand, the environment is more uncer- 7
tain and learning is slower. Because systemic crises are rare, learning about them 8
is also slow, and that is why uncertainty regarding leverage and land prices remains 9
in the model dynamics for a much longer period of time. Lastly, while in Boz and 10
Mendoza (2014) agents know the land price and forecast only the transition proba- 11
bility of leverage, we extend it to include land prices, since it directly depends on the 12
leverage (via the shadow value of collateral). We think that our approach is more 13
realistic under the asset pricing of Mendoza (2010) since a complete knowledge of 14
the land price would allow households to learn the ‘true’ value of leverage by solving 15
the rest of the model and recursively extract the value of leverage. 16
4.3 Distributions and statistical moments over the business 17
cycle 18
The second part of the model evaluation consists of analysing and validating the 19
model-generated distribution and statistical moments over the business cycle. These 20
are generated using the entire sample of 2000 quarters. For our purposes, we will 21
use the data on (auto)-correlations in Table II.1, the data on second and higher 22
moments in Table II.2, as well as histograms of a selection of these variables in 23
Figures II.5 to II.7. 24
4.3.1 Correlations 25
The model is capable of generating high persistence in the evolution of key variables. 26
Except for the nominal interest rate, the rest has an autocorrelation coefficient above 27
0.95. That is much higher than in most DSGE models. Following the discussion in 28
De Grauwe and Macchiarrelli (2015), we believe that the learning framework is the 29
underlying cause of this high persistence in the model since beliefs are self-inforcing 30
and therefore persistent over time. This pattern has also been documented in other 31
medium-size learning DSGE models, such as Slobodyan and Wouters (2012), where 32
29
they show that learning improves the fit of the model to the data compared to the1
benchmark Smets and Wouters (2007) set-up. Moreover, we note that the persis-2
tence of the financial friction variables is slightly higher than that of the macroe-3
conomic ones (consumption, land price, policy rate). Hence, there is an additional4
layer of persistence coming from the credit friction, albeit the difference is small.5
Cross-correlations between the model variables is also high. Most variables are6
positively correlated, except the ones including leverage and the interest rate on7
borrowing. A higher leverage reduces (future) consumption (ρ = −0.975) since it8
reduces the value of land (ρ = 0.985) and it restricts the amount the impatient9
households can borrow. Similarly, a higher interest rate means that households can10
borrow less, and therefore consume less (ρ = −0.99). Equally, the interest rate11
on borrowings and the land price are negatively correlated since a lower value of12
collateral increases the cost of borrowing (via the collateral channel), or a higher13
borrowing rate increases the discounting of todays value of land, by generating lower14
consumption (ρ = −0.99).15
4.3.2 Distributions and statistical moments16
The key thing to note in this section is that all model variables captured in Figures17
II.5 to II.7 and Table II.2 are non-Gaussian, skewed and with fatter tails compared18
to variables in standard DSGE models. Normality tests have lead us to reject the19
assumption of normal distributions.20
The variance of almost all variables (except for bank equity and market senti-21
ment) is very high, which means that there are high fluctuations in these variables22
over the business cycles (i.e. the amplitude of the cycles is high). Moreover, we see23
two patterns in the skewness and tails. While consumption, credit, land price, and24
bank equity have a negative skew (to the left) and with a fatter tails on the left25
side, leverage, the interest rates and market sentiment have a positive skewness (to26
the right) and a fatter tail on the right. This means that while there are signifi-27
cant booms (i.e. a high probability mass on the right of the median), with a rise28
in credit, leverage, consumption and drop in borrowing rate, the reversals are so29
sharp that the drop in these variables (or rise in borrowing rate) outperforms the30
booms, and that is why we see those shapes in the distributions. Hence systemic31
crises drive the probability mass much further from the mean, and the ‘true’ prob-32
ability of such events becomes significantly above zero at any point in time. In RE33
frameworks, households would know all this information which would lead them to34
30
price in the probability of systemic shutdowns in their optimizations, which most 1
probably would mean that credit, leverage and consumption would not build-up as 2
much. But, because of uncertainty in our framework, agents have a harder task to 3
define (and understand) these distributions (in particular for leverage and land price 4
and so missprice the ‘true’ tail-risks including an ex ante underpricing of systemic 5
crises events.18 6
4.4 Impulse response analysis 7
Figures II.8 to II.9 depict the impulse responses to a positive TFP shock and Figures 8
II.10 to II.11 to an expansionary monetary policy shock. 9
The numbers on the x-axis indicate number of quarters. All the shocks are intro- 10
duced in t=100 and we observe the responses over a period of 50 quarters (or 12.5 11
years). Note that in these figures we depict the median impulse response in black 12
amongst a distribution of impulse responses generated with different intializations of 13
the learning parameters. The red lines in the Figures represent the 95% confidence 14
intervals, or a full distribution of impulse responses. For the sake of clarity and focus 15
in the discussions, we will only concentrate on the median impulse response, which 16
is a good representation of the overall distribution. Moreover, we will only concen- 17
trate on the standard TFP and monetary policy shocks in the text since these are 18
standard in the literature and are modelled with persistence. However, should you 19
want to see the discussion of the other two shocks (a negative bank capital quality 20
and a positive (financial) wealth shock) do not hesitate to contact the authors. 21
4.4.1 TFP shock 22
A 1% TFP shock improves the production of land, and therefore increases the land 23
price by 1.5%. Because quantity of land is fixed, all of the efficiency improvement 24
will go to land price, by improving the intertemporal consumption smoothing of 25
households. Since value of household equity goes up, leverage of impatient house- 26
holds decreases by 1.6%, and their external financing possibilities improves. Via the 27
collateral constraint, impatient households are able to borrow more for the same 28
collateral, which initially pushes up the loans they obtain by 0.4%. For financial 29
intermediaries, this leads to a higher bank equity value (0.04%), which gives them 30
18Only after a sufficient number of crises events have occured, and assuming that the distribu-
tions of these variables do not change over time, they will start to approach their pricing of these
systemic events closer to the ‘true’ probability.
31
space to extend their credit line even further since their capital-to-asset ratio has1
increased. Via the interest rate margin equation, they reduce the interest rate on2
borrowing to households by 0.65%. This lower cost on loan repayment in turn allows3
impatient households to extend their borrowing even further in t=102, resulting in a4
peak increase in external financing at 0.65% above the pre-shock level. For financial5
intermediaries, this is an additional increase of bank equity by 0.02%, implying a6
total of 0.06% expansion in bank equity as a result of the TFP shock. Hence bank7
can extend its activty and size as a result of an improvement in the real (production)8
sector.9
However, this extension in credit makes the households gradually more leveraged,10
and the opposite mechanism is then set in motion. The higher leverage raises the11
value of the left-hand side of equation 5, which reduces the amount of next-period12
borrowing (because of their negative relation), which in turn reduces their (future)13
consumption possibility, and therefore the price of land. This opposite mechanism14
continues until the economy returns to its pre-shock level.15
4.4.2 Monetary policy shock16
A reduction of 1% in the (risk-free) interest rate reduces the deposit rate by the17
same amount (since Rdt = rt). Since this reduces the financing cost for banks, they18
can therefore reduce their cost of lending in order to extend their asset side and19
increase their profitability. The resulting rise in bank lending increases the amount20
of credit that households get, and therefore their (expected) consumption possibility.21
Via the pricing function of land in equation 12, the land price also increases. This22
reduces the leverage of (impatient) households, and via the collateral constraint23
allows them to borrow more. The cost of borrowing therefore reduces even further,24
and the bank extends its credit even further. As a result, bank equity rises. The25
total effect of the expansionary monetary policy shock is that the interest rate on26
borrowings falls by 0.45%, the expansion in credit is 0.45%, the rise in land price27
is 0.9%, and the fall in leverage 1.55%. The resulting boom in consumption is28
first 0.8% followed by 1.1%, and the rise in profitability of intermediaries raises its29
total bank equity by 0.04%. Note that while the economy (including the financial30
sector) expands following both shocks, the expansion is quantitatively larger for31
the supply side (or TFP) shock.19That is not surprising since our framework lacks32
19Remember that both shocks are calibrated int he same way. The standard deviation of the
white noise component is standardized to 1% while AR component is calibrated to 0.9. That is
32
sticky prices or wages which would make the monetary policy transmission more 1
persistent, as in standard NK-models. Therefore in our framework, policy makers 2
should concentrate on supply-side policies to generate sustained booms rather than 3
using (discretionary) monetary policy. Therefore, we also expect (relatively) a high 4
efficiency of macroprudential policy in smoothening the cycles, since the policy can 5
be viewed as a type of supply-side constraint on the “production” in the financial 6
sector. 7
5 Macroprudential policy 8
To quantify the (stabilizing) effects that a macroprudential policy can have, in par- 9
ticular on reducing the number (and impact) of systemic crises, we will evaluate 10
one particular type of macroprudential policy. We will concentrate on a cap on 11
(household) LTV, where the central bank will alllow households to leverage up to a 12
certain level (but not beyond), and therefore restrict intermediaries to extend their 13
credit supply only up to a certain quantity. 14
Tables II.3 to II.4 report the statistical moments of the model variables with and 15
without macroprudential policy. Figures II.12 to II.14 depict the same moments in 16
terms of distributions for a selection of key model variables. Lastly, Figure II.15 17
compares the number of systemic crises compared to the benchmark model, while 18
Figure II.16 shows the number of switches between the extrapolative and fundamen- 19
talist rule for land price with and without a macroprudential rule. 20
For a list of figures for the remaining model variables, please do not hesitate to 21
contact the authors. 22
In our simulations, we set the LTV cap at 2. The effects are significant. 23
Starting with learning dynamics, because of the benchmark provided by the 24
cap, the learning with respect to the leverage is rapid. It only takes a few periods 25
for households to understand what their maximum limit is, and therefore their 26
subjective expectations converge to rational expectations. Under this setting, the 27
extrapolative rule becomes the best predictor of the future as no variations in that 28
variable will occur. 29
For land price in Figure II.16, the learning dynamics also changes. The funda- 30
mentalist rule becomes more frequently visited compared to the benchmark model 31
setting. We believe the reason is because agents now only need to learn about one 32
why we can directly compare the two effects.
33
variable meanwhile the other has a fixed point. Hence, bechnmarking the land price1
q becomes more useful in forecasting since fluctuations in the model are reduced and2
therefore using a fixed reference point for forecasting becomes more effective.3
In terms of the macroeconomic and financial model variables, we also see a4
significant change. Looking at the statistical moments and distrubtuons, we see that5
most variables become more Gaussian. The distributions become more symmetric6
and the fat tails are reduced. In practical terms, it means that sharp rises or dropis7
in these variables are reduced, as well as probabilities of systemic crises. Many8
(auto)-correlations are reduced, which implies less of the (market) sentiment driven9
cycles that we observed before. In addition, the volatilities and skewness of the10
variables are reduced by a factor of 2-4. Meanwhile, the kurtosis increases slightly,11
which means that the distribution becomes more centred around its mean/median.12
That is clearly visible in the figures for consumption, land price and credit.13
This is also visible in Figure II.15. Comparing the number of systemic crises in14
the benchmark model with the augmented version, we observe a reduction of 50% in15
the latter. Instead of the original 10 crises in 500 years, we now get 5 crises over the16
same time period. In particular, the sequence of systemic crises that occurs after17
the second are (almost) reduced. Moreover, the losses in each of the crises is also18
reduced. Noting that the scaling in the second graph is 3 to 4 times smaller, the19
losses in each of the crises is reduced by, on average, a factor of 3. Thus, an LTV-cap20
does not only reduce the probability of a systemic crises by 50%, but it also reduces21
the losses incurred by each. As a result, the business cycles become shorter and the22
amplitude of each smaller.23
While it is clear that the policy smoothens the cycles and reduces the systemic24
events, we would like to quantify these effects in terms of households’ welfare. In25
standard RE DSGE models, one would value the welfare effects by calculating the26
(welfare) gains using a second order approximation of households’ welfare. However,27
in our model, RE is substituted with subjective beliefs, which means that the policy28
maker does not know how to weight these beliefs into a general welfare function.29
Hence, imperfect information also concerns households’ welfare.2030
To overcome this problem, we instead value the welfare using utility (or consump-31
tion equivalence) measure of an economy with and without the policy. Knowing the32
parameters in the utility function, and the median consumption of households in33
20Recently, Brunnermeier et al (2014) are trying to define ‘belief-neutral’ welfare functions in
models with distorted (or imperfect) beliefs. However, more work is necessary before a robust
method can be obtained for loss function derivations.
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an economy with and without the LTV-cap, we can calculate the utility gains that 1
households will get from imposing the rule.21Since household utility only depends 2
on consumption, the gains will be expressed in consumption equivalence terms. 3
We find that the utility gains from using a cap on household LTV is 6.5%. It 4
means that, on average, a household will consume 6.5% more when a central bank 5
imposes a cap compared to an economy without it. Decomposing this gain, we find 6
that 6% out of the 6.5% derives from an increase in the level of consumption, while 7
0.5% comes from a reduction in variability (or volatility) of consumption over the 8
cycle. The reason for this heavy gain in level, we believe, comes from the reduction 9
in the systemic crises. Systemic crises are events when most of the consumption 10
level is reduced. In relative terms, this reduction in level is even higher than the 11
reduction in volatility of consumption, since the ex ante probability mass of such 12
event is not big. However, once that state becomes absorbing, the reduction in level 13
is very high. 14
To conclude, we compare our results with a more elaborate version of the LTV- 15
rule. Following the recent literature on macroprudential policy (see, for instance 16
Lambertini et al (2013) or Angelini et al (2014)), we also try a Taylor-type rule 17
specified in equation 19. We find that a more complex LTV-rule generates very 18
similar economic outcomes to the simplier rule we have used before. The only 19
difference is that the Taylor-type rule smoothens the fluctuations in the interest 20
rates by more. We believe that the explanation for this similarity lies in the learning. 21
While a Taylor-type rule increases the information content in the reaction function 22
and allows the central bank to react to more financial variables, it also delays learning 23
since some uncertainty regarding the leverage level remains. In the simplier rule, 24
on the other hand, there are gains from the heavy ‘benchmarking’ that a fixed 25
rule gives to households in their learning process. Having a fixed reference point 26
regarding leverage reduces uncertainty regarding its (future) value compared to a 27
more complex rule. We see that the fluctuations in the usage of extrapolative versus 28
fundamentalist rule for leverage is higher under the Taylor-type rule, which generates 29
additional dynamics. As a result, the simple LTV-rule is, in relative terms, more 30
effective in generating stability at a lower monitoring (or information) cost. 31
21Note that since model variables have asymmetric distributions in the benchmark model, the
median is more representative of the centre of the distribution, rather than the mean. That is hwy
we use the median consumption in our calculations. We could, however, trivially re-run the same
experiments using the mean consumption values.
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6 Discussion and concluding remarks1
Deregulation in the financial services industry since 1980’s, the increased competi-2
tion amongst financial intermediaries and the unprecedented expansion in financial3
engineering since mid-1990’s has, in an exceptional manner, increased the size of4
the financial sector. Their credit lines to the real economy, and the consumption5
possibility of households has been historically the highest in the period prior to the6
Great Recession. The US (and to certain extent the EU) economy experienced one7
of its sharpest booms in early 2000’s. On the other end, however, the pricing of8
risks and leverage became an increasingly difficult task as uncertainty regarding the9
true accumulation of risks on balance sheets and the true exposure of households10
increased. The misspricing of risks gave leeway to market speculation and market11
sentiment-driven cycles. We include these observations in a recent model by Boz and12
Mendoza (2014), and analyze the effects of dynamic optimization under uncertainty13
on the macro-financial cycles, and the probability of systemic crises. In particular,14
we are interested in understanding the role that macroprudential policy plays in15
reducing the probability of systemic events and the losses generated by these.16
Including these facts into a general equilibrium model with adaptive learning17
result in an increase in the amplitude and frequency of the cycles. The build-up18
phase of risks, credit, leverage and consumption is much longer and higher than19
in standard DSGE models. In the same way, once a reversal in lending occurs,20
the decline in all variables is also much sharper and lasts shorter. The probability21
of systemic crises is significant, and we find that, on average, 2 such crises occur22
every century. Moreover, we find that, different from standard boom-bust cycles,23
a systemic crisis can be followed by a sequence of subsequent contractions, as it24
makes the economy more unstable. The result is asymmetric distributions of key25
macroeconomic and financial variables, with high skewness and fat tails.26
A simple cap on the LTV-ratio is effective in smoothening the cycles and reducing27
the effects of a deep contraction on the real-financial variables. The model distri-28
butions become much more symmetric and Gaussian. It also reduces the amount29
of borrowing and leverage in upturns. The number of systemic crises is halfed, and30
the losses at each is reduced by, on average, a factor of 3. The consumption (utility)31
gains from such a policy are, on average 6.5% compared to an economy without a32
macroprudential rule. Also the stabilizing role of monetary policy is increased once33
a macrprudential rule is used. To conclude, a simple LTV-rule is preferred to a34
36
more elaborate Taylor-type version because it provides a strong ‘benchmarking’ to 1
agents in their learning process, while generating same welfare (improving) effects 2
at a lower information cost. 3
These are promissing results in our understanding of the probability of systemic 4
events, and their destabilizing macroeconomic impacts. While the road in reaching 5
a full understanding of such events is long, these should hopefully be seen as a 6
contribution in the right direction. Future research should therefore try to stretch 7
the framework of this paper in multiple directions. 8
First, a robust comparison is necessary between the learning framework in this 9
model and the Bayesian set-up in Boz and Mendoza (2014). Both are actively used 10
in the literature, and a serious comparison in terms of long-term learning, memory 11
and model dynamics should be welcomed. 12
Equally, the regime-switching in rules in this framework should be compared to 13
homogenous learning set-ups. A lot of the dynamics in this model comes from the 14
regime switching in switching. It would therefore be interesting to see the type of 15
macroeconomic dynamics we would get if agents use only one rule, possibly a more 16
elaborate adaptive rule such as least-square learning. 17
It would also be interesting to conduct a robustness exercise to test the model 18
performance for a larger parameter space of the learning variables. On the same 19
lines, it would be highly relevant for policy purposes to find the optimal LTV-cap 20
whereby gains from such a rule are maximized. 21
Lastly, systemic crises are rare and non-linear events. Therefore, it would be of 22
high interest to zoom-in such periods and only study the dynamics once such event 23
becomes absorbing. In particular, it would be interesting to examine the statistical 24
moments, the distributions and the transmission channels under only such states. 25
That would bring the model closer to the recent but blooming empirical literature 26
on tail-events and hyper correlations. 27
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Appendices 3
I The FOCs and the full model system 4
I.1 Households 5
Setting up the Lagrangians for the patient households, we get: 6
LP = E0β
t
P
(cPt )
1−σ
1− σ + λ
P
t [ztg(lt) + qtlt − qtlt+1 + (1 +Rd)dt − dt+1 − cPt − et] (I.1)
Taking the first order conditions with respect to cPt , lt and dt, we get: 7
∂LP
∂cPt
= (1− σ)(c
P
t )
−σ
1− σ − λ
P
t = 0⇔ λPt = (cPt )−σ (I.2)
where we set σ < 5 in order to find a reasonable solution. 8
∂LP
∂lt
= λPt ztg
′(lt) + qt − βPEst [λPt+1qt+1] = 0⇔
qt = βPE
s
t [λ
P
t+1qt+1]− λPt ztg′(lt)⇔
qt = βPE
s
t [(c
P
t+1)
−σqt+1]− (cPt )−σztg′(lt) (I.3)
∂LP
∂dt
= λPt (1 +R
d
t )− βPEst [λPt+1] = 0⇔
(1 +Rdt ) =
βPEst [λ
P
t+1]
λPt
⇔
(1 +Rdt ) =
βPEst [(c
P
t+1)
−σ]
(cPt )
−σ (I.4)
Similarly, for impatient households we get the following Lagrangian: 9
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LI = E0β
t
I
(cIt )
1−σ
1− σ + λ
I
t [qtlt − qtlt+1 −
bt+1
RBt
+ bt − cIt ] + γIt [−κtqtlt+1 −
bt+1
RBt
] (I.5)
Taking the first order conditions with respect to cIt , lt and bt, we get:1
∂LI
∂cIt
= (1− σ)(c
I
t )
−σ
1− σ − λ
I
t = 0⇔ λIt = (cIt )−σ (I.6)
where we again set σ < 5 in order to find a reasonable solution.2
∂LI
∂lt
= λIt qt − βIEst [λIt+1qt+1 + γIκtqt+1] = 0⇔
λIt qt = βIE
s
t [λ
I
t+1qt+1 + γ
Iκtqt+1]⇔
qt =
βIE
s
t [λ
I
t+1qt+1 + γ
Iκtqt+1]
λIt
⇔
qt =
βIE
s
t [(c
I
t+1)
−σqt+1 + γIκtqt+1]
(cIt )
−σ ⇔
qt =
βIE
s
t [((c
I
t+1)
−σ + γIκt)qt+1]
(cIt )
−σ ⇔
qt =
βI((c
I
t+1)
−σ + γIκt − γIκt
(cIt )
−σ − γIκt ⇔
qt =
βI(c
I
t+1)
−σ
(cIt )
−σ − γIκt (I.7)
By combining equations I.3 and I.7, we get the expression for land price as3
in Boz and Mendoza (2014). However, because we differentiate our households,4
the price of land is determined by the Euler equations of both the patient and5
impatient households. As a result, the (final) price of land will be a balance of6
the two, taking into account the differentiated discount factors (βP < βI), i.e.7
βIct+1
ct−γIκt = βPE
s
t [ct+1qt+1] − ctztg′(lt) ≡ qt. Because the share of the two household8
types in the economy is normalized to unti, we can write: cPt = c
I
t = ct. That is the9
same expression as in I.22.10
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∂LI
∂bt
= λIt − βIEst [
λIt+1
RBt+1
+
γIt+1
RBt+1
] = 0⇔
λIt = βIE
s
t [
λIt+1
RBt+1
+
γIt+1
RBt+1
]⇔
(cIt )
−σ = βI
1
RBt+1
Est [(c
I
t+1)
−σ + γIt+1]
(I.8)
In addition, we include the three constraints (one for impatient and two for 1
patient households) as first order conditions with respect to λPt , λ
I
t and γ
I
t . 2
I.2 Financial Intermediary 3
For financiel intermediaries, once we recognize that patient households own the 4
intermediaries, we get the following Lagrangian: 5
LF = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtPλ
P
t [(1 +R
b)Bt −Bt+1 +Dt+1 − (1 +Rdt )Dt + (Ebt+1 − Ebt )
−κEb
2
[
Ebt
Bt
− νb]2Ebt + λFt (Dt + EBt −Bt)] (I.9)
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to Bt and Dt gives us: 6
∂LF
∂Bt
= βtPλ
P
t [R
B
t −κEB [
EBt
Bt
−νB][−E
B
t
B2t
]EBt −λFt ] = 0⇔ λFt = [RBt −κEB [
EBt
Bt
−νB][E
B
t
Bt
]2]/βPλPt
(I.10)
∂LF
∂Dt
= βtPλ
P
t [−RDt + λFt ] = 0⇔ λFt = RDt /βPλPt (I.11)
Substituting ∂LF
∂Bt
into ∂LF
∂Dt
, via the Lagrangian multiplier λFt , and multiplying 7
both sides with βPλPt to get: 8
RDt = R
B
t − κEB [
EBt
Bt
− νB][E
B
t
Bt
]2 (I.12)
Using the no arbitrage condition in bank financing, it implies that RDt ≡ rt, and 9
we can rewrite the last expression as: 10
43
RBt = rt + κEB [
EBt
Bt
− νB][E
B
t
Bt
]2 (I.13)
This is the same as in expression 11. Moreover, we include the balance sheet1
constraint Bt = Dt+E
B
t into the list of FOC. We also include the evolution of bank2
capital in the conditions for financial intermediary, which is:3
EBt = (1− δk)EBt−1 + ωB[RBt Bt −RDt Dt −
κEB
2
[
EBt
Bt
− νB]2EBt − AdjBt ] (I.14)
I.3 Government4
We complement the private sector optimizations with the government policies. In5
particular, the government sets rt according to:6
rt
r
=
rt−1
r
γR
[
pit
pi
γpi yt
y
γy
]1−γReR,t (I.15)
As a compliment, the government conducts a set of macroprudential policies7
(caps on LTV–ratios and capital requirements) according to:’8
κt = κ¯ (I.16)
with the true drift equal to:9
κt = γκκt−1 + (1− γκ)κ+ κ,t (I.17)
and a (bank) capital ratio to:10
et
bt
≤ e¯ or dt
bt
≥ d (I.18)
I.4 Aggregation11
The clearing condition for the market of goods is:12
ct +
bt+1
Rbt
+ AdjBt = bt + ztg(lt) + δ
kEBt (I.19)
The aggregate resource constraint in this economy is therefore:13
rct = ct + qt[lt − lt−1] + δkEBt + AdjBt (I.20)
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where ct = c
P
t + c
I
t and Adj
B
t is a calibrated cost parameter. In the asset (land) 1
market, the clearing condition is given by: 2
1 = lt (I.21)
I.5 Equilibrium system 3
Next, we need to define the equilibrium conditions and the state variables which will 4
be the key for solving the learning model. We define the pricing function for land: 5
qt = E
s
t [
∞∑
j=0
[
∞∏
i=0
1
Est [R
q
t+1+i]
]zt+1+jg
′(lt+1+j)] (I.22)
where the spread between the return on land and the policy rate is: 6
Est [R
q
t+1 −Rt] =
(1− κt)γIt − Covst (λIt+1, Rqt+1)
Est [λ
I
t+1]
and the return on land conditional on date-t belief is defined as: 7
Est [R
q
t+1] =
zt+1g
′(lt+1) + qt+1
qt
and the (land) production function is g(lt) = l
α
t . 8
The pricing function for the interest rate on loans (bond) is: 9
RBt = rt + κ
EB [
EBt
Bt
− νB][E
B
t
Bt
]2 (I.23)
and for the interest rate on deposits it is: 10
(1 +RDt ) =
βPEst [c
P
t+1]
cPt
(I.24)
We also have the following policy functions: 11
(cIt )
−σ = βI
1
RBt+1
Est [(c
I
t+1)
−σ + γIt+1] (I.25)
dt+1 + c
P
t ≤ ztg(lt) + qtlt − qtlt+1 + (1 +Rdt )dt + et (I.26)
cIt ≤ qtlt − qtlt+1 −
bt+1
Rbt
+ bt (I.27)
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κtqtlt+1 ≤ −bt+1
Rbt
(I.28)
and the state equation:1
EBt = (1− δk)EBt−1 + ωB[RBt Bt −RDt Dt −
κEB
2
[
EBt
Bt
− νB]2EBt − AdjBt ] (I.29)
To complete the system we define the shocks that we use. In particular, we2
define the (known) TFP-shock process zt as:3
ln(zt+1) = ρln(zt) + z (I.30)
the capital quality shock κB as:4
κB ∼ N(0, σ2
κB
) (I.31)
where the same shock could be interpreted as an equity injection by the macro-5
prudential authority. Lastly, we define an income shock eψ according to:6
ψ ∼ N(0, σψ) (I.32)
The income shock can be interpreted as exogenous movements in land prices, or7
in return of land.8
We solve this system according to the method and algorithm described in section9
3.10
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II Figures and Tables 1
Table II.1: Model (auto)-
correlations
Variables (Auto)-correlations
ρ(bt, bt−1) 0.988
ρ(ct, ct−1) 0.972
ρ(Ebt , E
b
t−1) 0.988
ρ(qt, qt−1) 0.986
ρ(rt, rt−1) 0.883
ρ(κt, κt−1) 0.99
ρ(rbt , r
b
t−1) 0.988
ρ(bt, κt) 0.99
ρ(ct,mst) 0.82
ρ(bt, ct) 0.989
ρ(ct, κt) -0.975
ρ(bt, qt) 0.99
ρ(qt, κt) -0.985
ρ(rt, yt) 0.17
ρ(ct, r
b
t ) -0.99
ρ(qt, r
b
t ) -0.99
Table II.2: Second and higher moments
Variables Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosiss
bt 4.76 -0.09 2.65
ct 9.55 -0.09 2.68
Ebt 0.43 -0.09 2.65
κt 12.03 0.1 2.68
qt 11.24 -0.06 2.64
mst 0.48 0.26 1.11
rt 2.17 0.24 3.11
rbt 4.76 0.09 2.65
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Table II.3: Model (auto)-correlations comparison
Variables (Auto)-correlations without macro-pru (Auto)-correlations with macro-pru
ρ(bt, bt−1) 0.988 0.954
ρ(ct, ct−1) 0.972 0.836
ρ(Ebt , E
b
t−1) 0.988 0.954
ρ(qt, qt−1) 0.986 0.952
ρ(rt, rt−1) 0.883 0.88
ρ(κt, κt−1) 0.99 0.99
ρ(rbt , r
b
t−1) 0.988 0.954
ρ(bt, κt) 0.99 0.01
ρ(ct, ast) 0.82 0.76
ρ(bt, ct) 0.989 0.888
ρ(ct, κt) -0.975 -0.01
ρ(bt, qt) 0.99 0.97
ρ(qt, κt) -0.985 -0.01
ρ(rt, yt) 0.17 0.30
ρ(ct, r
b
t ) -0.99 -0.88
ρ(qt, r
b
t ) -0.99 -0.97
‘’“”’–1
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Table II.4: Second and higher moments comparison
Variables Standard deviations (pre/post) Skewness (pre/post) Kurtosiss (pre/post)
bt 4.76/1.46 -0.09/-0.04 2.65/2.72
ct 9.55/3 -0.09/-0.03 2.68/2.87
Ebt 0.43/0.13 -0.09/-0.04 2.65/2.72
κt 12.03/0.05 0.1/-44.69 2.68/2000
qt 11.24/5.01 -0.06/0.03 2.64/2.7
ast 0.48/0.43 0.26/0.60 1.11/1.55
rt 2.17/2.17 0.24/0.24 3.11/3.11
rbt 4.76/1.46 0.09/0.04 2.65/2.72
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Figure II.1: Evolution of the key aggregate variables
50
Figure II.2: Evolution of the key aggregate variables 2
51
Figure II.3: Evolution of the key aggregate variables
3
52
Figure II.4: Learning dynamics
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Figure II.5: Histograms
54
Figure II.6: Histograms 2
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Figure II.7: Histograms 3
56
Figure II.8: Impulse responses to a positive TFP shock in t=100
57
Figure II.9: Impulse responses 2 to a positive TFP shock in t=100
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Figure II.10: Impulse responses to an expansionary monetary policy shock in t=100
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Figure II.11: Impulse responses 2 to an expansionary monetary policy shock in
t=100
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Figure II.12: Macroprudential policy effects
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Figure II.13: Macroprudential policy effects 2
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Figure II.14: Macroprudential policy effects 3
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Figure II.15: Macroprudential policy effects 4
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Figure II.16: Macroprudential policy effects 5
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